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Abstract15
Some well-established scientific findings may be rejected by vocal minorities because the16
evidence is in conflict with political views or economic interests. For example, the tobacco17
industry denied the medical consensus on the harms of smoking for decades, and the clear18
evidence about human-caused climate change is currently being rejected by many19
politicians and think tanks that oppose regulatory action. We present an agent-based20
model of the processes by which denial of climate change can occur, how opinions that run21
counter to the evidence can affect the scientific community, and how denial can alter the22
public discourse. The model involves an ensemble of Bayesian agents, representing the23
scientific community, that are presented with the emerging historical evidence of climate24
change and that also communicate the evidence to each other. Over time, the scientific25
community comes to agreement that the climate is changing. When a minority of agents26
is introduced that is resistant to the evidence, but that enter into the scientific discussion,27
the simulated scientific community still acquires firm knowledge but consensus formation is28
delayed. When both types of agents are communicating with the general public, the public29
remains ambivalent about the reality of climate change. The model captures essential30
aspects of the actual evolution of scientific and public opinion during the last 4 decades.31
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Influence and seepage: An evidence-resistant minority can32
affect public opinion and scientific belief formation33
34
More than 150 years ago, John Tyndall demonstrated experimentally that “carbonic35
acid”, despite being a perfectly colorless and invisible gas, was able to absorb heat36
radiation. Unlike the atmosphere, carbonic acid was nearly opaque to radiant heat. We37
now refer to carbonic acid as CO2, and following on the heels of Tyndall’s discovery, it38
was recognized more than a century ago that industrial CO2 emissions may alter the39
Earth’s climate (Arrhenius, 1896). During the last two decades, the evidence that humans40
are altering the climate has become unequivocal. There is near unanimity (around 97%)41
among domain experts that the climate is changing due to emissions of CO2 and other42
greenhouse gases, mainly from combustion of fossil fuels (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, &43
Schneider, 2010; Cook et al., 2013, 2016; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009; Oreskes, 2004). The44
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) periodically summarizes the scientific45
consensus in Assessment Reports (e.g., most recently AR5; IPCC, 2013).46
Notwithstanding this pervasive scientific agreement, the public in some countries47
continues to be divided on whether or not climate change presents a real risk and is48
caused by fossil-fuel combustion. For example, Carmichael and Brulle (2017) showed in an49
analysis of 74 surveys (between 2002–2013) that public concern with climate change in the50
U.S. peaked in 2008 but then declined until 2011. Although the relevance of those51
fluctuations in opinion is subject to debate (e.g., Egan & Mullin, 2017), there is no doubt52
that currently many Americans (around 36%; Egan & Mullin, 2017) are not worried about53
climate change, and that a similar number or more do not accept its human origins54
(Hamilton, Hartter, Lemcke-Stampone, Moore, & Safford, 2015). The public also widely55
underestimates the extent of the scientific consensus. As of 2016, less than 70% of the56
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public recognize that most scientists agree on climate change, although that share has57
increased from 50% in 2010 (Hamilton, 2016).58
The reasons for the discrepancy between the scientific agreement and the public’s59
low concern are well understood. Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins (2012) showed that60
public opinion is guided by elite cues and mobilization of advocacy groups, with media61
coverage being an important conduit of that influence. There is abundant evidence for the62
existence of a well-organized campaign that seeks to undermine the public’s understanding63
of climate change (e.g., Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Dunlap, 2013; McCright & Dunlap,64
2003, 2010; Medimorec & Pennycook, 2015; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Analysis of IRS65
data puts the income of a network of conservative think tanks at somewhere near $166
billion annually (Brulle, 2013). At least in part, this network is dedicated to questioning67
the scientific consensus on climate change.68
The effects of that funding are detectable in a number of ways. The vast majority of69
books (over 90%) that are critical of mainstream climate science are linked to conservative70
think tanks (Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008). The influence71
on public discourse of two core funders—ExxonMobil and the Koch family72
foundations—was identified in a network analysis by Farrell (2015). Organizations that73
received fundings from those two entities were significantly more central to the network74
than individuals or organizations without such funding. Moreover, Farrell found that the75
semantic similarity between the output of this denial network and coverage in the76
mainstream media increased between 1993 and 2013. A similar increase was observed in77
the speeches of U.S. presidents, albeit at a lower level of similarity overall. Although the78
direction of causality cannot be ascertained from those data, one interpretation is that the79
efforts of conservative think tanks (Brulle, 2013) and Exxon (Supran & Oreskes, 2017)80
had the intended effect of shaping public discourse with denialist talking points, thereby81
delaying meaningful mitigation efforts.82
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In particular, the denialist campaign is likely to be behind the public’s83
under-estimation of the consensus among scientists (Hamilton, 2016). This is more than a84
mere miscalibration, given that appreciation of the consensus has been identified as a85
“gateway” belief that determines people’s policy support (van der Linden, Leiserowitz,86
Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). When people are educated about the scientific consensus in87
experiments, this has been repeatedly shown to increase people’s acceptance of the88
underlying science (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; S. L. van der Linden,89
Clarke, & Maibach, 2015; S. van der Linden, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2018). Conversely, a90
single dissenting opinion has been shown to be sufficient to reduce people’s beliefs in the91
adequacy of scientific evidence to guide government policy (Koehler, 2016; see also Bovens92
& Hartmann, 2004). The creation of a chimerical scientific debate is thus an effective93
trigger of cognitive mechanisms that are likely to disengage the public and reduce their94
demands for policy action.95
In addition to these effects of organized denial on the public and political spheres,96
there are indications that contrarian activity has also affected the scientific community97
itself. Freudenburg and Muselli (2010) showed that the IPCC’s consensus report (AR4 at98
the time) had been too conservative rather than too alarmist, as revealed by an analysis of99
media coverage of subsequent new scientific findings. Further confirmation of the IPCC’s100
conservatism was provided in a textual analysis by Medimorec and Pennycook (2015),101
which found that the IPCC (AR5) used more cautious and uncertain language than102
documents produced by a conservative think tank committed to denying the scientific103
consensus.104
Other work has identified the “reticence” of scientists to confront the full105
implications of their findings (Hansen, 2007), their propensity to “err on the side of least106
drama” (Brysse, Oreskes, O’Reilly, & Oppenheimer, 2013), and their concern of being107
portrayed as “alarmist” (Risbey, 2008) as factors that might lead the scientific community108
Influence and seepage 6
to paint risks in a less dramatic light. A recent extension of this argument suggested that109
denial may have “seeped” into the scientific community itself (Lewandowsky, Oreskes,110
Risbey, Newell, & Smithson, 2015). Lewandowsky et al. identified several known111
psychological processes, such as stereotype threat or pluralistic ignorance, that might112
render scientists’ work vulnerable to contrarian attacks which are often toxic and personal113
(Lewandowsky, 2019; Mann, 2012). One avenue of attack involves freedom-of-information114
(FOIA) requests, typically for scientists’ personal emails. Depending on jurisdiction, these115
requests may result in the release of thousands of emails between researchers, which are116
then quote-mined for compromising statements. There is evidence that personal emails117
between scientists can be exploited in this manner with a discernible impact on public118
opinion (Stoutenborough, Liu, & Vedlitz, 2014). Ley (2018) analyzed the impact of FOIA119
requests on scientists through in-depth interviews. He found that all respondents had120
altered their means of communication in response to an FOIA requests, with many121
scientists engaging in self-censorship and others resorting to phone calls. A minority also122
reported a chilling effect on their ability to express research ideas. The self-censorship123
that results from FOIA requests may be just one avenue by which pressure from political124
operatives could shape scientists’ interpretation of data notwithstanding their125
commitment to reject denialist talking points. Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al. (2015)126
illustrated the possibility of such “seepage” within the context of the recent presumed127
“pause” or “hiatus” in global warming.128
The “pause” refers to a period of slower-than-average warming, which is alleged to129
have occurred from around 1998 for around a decade, and which climate contrarians130
seized on to claim that global warming has “stopped” (e.g., Carter, 2006). Boykoff (2014)131
showed how the media and other public actors used the apparent slowdown in warming to132
create a frame for discussion around the notion that warming had unexpectedly “stopped”133
or “paused.” Statistical evidence for a “pause” or a significant slowdown is scarce or134
Influence and seepage 7
non-existent (Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes, 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2018; Risbey et135
al., 2018), and the notion of a “pause” has been identified as misleading in a blind expert136
test (Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes, 2016). Nonetheless, the scientific community137
responded to the fluctuation in warming rate with, to date, more than 200 peer-reviewed138
publications (Risbey et al., 2018). A number of those articles framed the “pause” as a139
challenge to the mainstream scientific view of greenhouse-driven global warming (see140
Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes, 2016, Table 2). Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al. (2015)141
argued that the scientific community’s concern with a short-term fluctuation in warming142
rate was likely amplified—or even generated—by the rhetoric of contrarian political143
operatives and their allies. However, Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al. could only provide144
circumstantial evidence to buttress their argument.145
This article explores the seepage notion within a quantitative theoretical approach.146
We present an agent-based model of the three principa groups of actors: the scientific147
commmunity, operatives in the organized denial network, and the public at large. All148
actors are represented by rational Bayesian agents that seek information by inspecting149
climate data or by communicating with each other. We design our agents to be Bayesian150
not only because people’s decisions can conform to Bayesian norms of rationality (e.g.,151
Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008; Lewandowsky, Griffiths, & Kalish, 2009), but in152
particular because even seemingly “irrational” behaviors can emerge from Bayesian153
principles. For example, belief polarization (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Jern, Chang, &154
Kemp, 2009) can be accommodated within a rational Bayesian framework, and it has been155
shown that Bayesian agents can form persistent “echo chambers,” enclosed epistemic156
bubbles in which agents share most beliefs (Madsen, Bailey, & Pilditch, 2018). The use of157
rational agents also seemed advisable in light of several suggestions that climate denial158
can be considered a rational enterprise (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Lewandowsky, Cook,159
& Lloyd, 2016), notwithstanding its wholesale dismissal of scientific evidence.160
Influence and seepage 8
We seed the model with the global temperature data from 1950 through 2017,161
sampling new observations on an annual basis. During each simulated year, the agents162
communicate with each other and update their belief in the hypothesis that the Earth is163
warming. The simulations below were designed to answer the following questions: (1) In164
the absence of organized denial, how quickly would the scientific community have settled165
on the consensus position that greenhouse-driven warming exists? (2) Given the strength166
of evidence for warming, how can rational agents remain resistant to the evidence and167
continue to deny climate change? (3) What are the effects of denial on the scientific168
community? In particular, is there evidence for “seepage”? (4) What are the effects of169
denial on the public at large? In particular, can actual public opinion be modeled without170




The model had access to two global temperature datasets: The HadCRUT4 product175
curated by the U.K. Met Office (Morice, Kennedy, Rayner, & Jones, 2012) and the176
GISTEMP dataset produced by NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (Hansen,177
Ruedy, Sato, & Lo, 2010). Both datasets record global mean surface temperature178
(GMST), expressed as anomalies from a climatological baseline. For the purposes of179
detecting changes in global climate, individual temperature observations are converted into180
deviations from a long-term average temperature (typically across 30 years) for the station181
in question. Those deviations, known as anomalies, are then averaged in an area-weighted182
manner across all locations around the world to estimate global temperature trends.183
Figure 1 shows GMST anomalies for the two datasets. Both datasets show that the Earth184
has been warming continuously since around 1970. The “pause” period refers to the185
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apparent decrease in warming rate during the decade after 1998. The figure also clarifies186
that this period is now clearly over, given the recent sharp up-tick in temperature.187
Although both datasets display very similar long term trends, when the same data188
are instead represented as trends of varying durations, some differences between datasets189
emerge. Figure 2 shows trends for HadCRUT4 (panel A) and GISTEMP (panel B). Each190
panel shows the warming trends that were observable, given the available data at the191
time, for any vantage point between 1984 and 2016 (horizontal axis). For each vantage192
point, between 3 and 25 years were included in the trend calculation (vertical axis) by193
moving backwards in time. Significant trends are indicated by a dot. For example, the194
entries for the final column in each panel record the trend values that were observable in195
2016, considering anywhere between the preceding 3 years (bottom row; 2014–2016) and196
25 years (top row; 1992–2016).197
Figure 2 clarifies that at any time since 1989, a significant warming trend was198
detectable if a sufficiently large number of observations was included. However, the figure199
also shows that if a small number of years is considered, trend values can fluctuate200
considerably and may in some cases even be negative. Those small-scale fluctuations are201
of no climatological relevance but offer an opportunity for contrarians to claim that global202
warming has “stopped” or “paused”. It is also apparent from the figure that the notion of203
a “pause” during the decade following 1998 was more visible with the HadCRUT dataset204
(panel A) than GISTEMP (panel B). The reasons for this are well understood: Unlike205
GISTEMP, HadCRUT does not record observations for much of the Arctic, the region of206
the globe that is known to warm most rapidly. When those coverage gaps are corrected by207
interpolation (Cowtan & Way, 2014), the divergence betweent HadCRUT4 and GISTEMP208
is largely eliminated (e.g., Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes, 2015; Risbey et al., 2018).209
Our model simulated the gradual acquisition of scientific knowledge about climate210
change by a population of agents that continually examined the most recent temperature211
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trend available at any given time. The number of years being considered by each agent was212
a model parameter, described below. Agents then communicated their perceptions of the213
data to each other, updating their prior beliefs with the new evidence and communications214
at each round. The top panel in Figure 3 provides a graphical overview of the model.215
Classes of agents216
The model comprised three classes of agents, representing mainstream scientists,217
contrarians, and the general public. One or more of those classes of agents was active in218
any given simulation. The proportions of scientists to contrarians, along with their219
representation in communicating to the public was manipulated between simulations.220
Scientists and contrarians221
Scientists and contrarians started with a prior belief in anthropogenic climate change222
of 1%, P (CC) = .01. Thus, all agents commenced from a position of strong skepticism of223
the global-warming hypothesis. The agents then sampled information from the real world224
by inspecting the climate data (HadCRUT or GISTEMP), and then updating their belief225
in climate change according to either an unbiased (scientists) or biased (contrarian)226
interpretation of temperature trends. Data sampling occurred annually. In between data227
sampling, scientists and contrarians communicated both among themselves (passing on228
trend information) and to the general public (passing on interpretations of the data), such229
that recipients of these communications further updated their belief in climate change230
(details below). Scientists and contrarians had the same functionality but differed in their231
settings of three parameters that defined each class of agents.232
Dataset preference. This parameter, DSPS and DSPC , represented the dataset233
(GISTEMP or HadCRUT) from which the agent drew data-points. This preference234
remained constant across the simulation run.235
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Memory window. The memory window parameter (MS for scientists and MC for236
contrarians, respectively) determined how many historical temperature observations237
agents considered as they inspect the data at each iteration to compute a warming trend.238
That trend constituted the latest evidence for climate change available to the agent. M239
varied between 3 and 30 and differed between scientists and contrarians. For scientists,240
MS was typically set to 15 or 30, representing climatological practice to ignore short-term241
fluctuations. For contrarians, MC was typically set to 3, reflecting the fact that denialist242
arguments pervasively rely on “cherry-picking” of short-term trends (Lewandowsky,243
Ballard, Oberauer, & Benestad, 2016). If an agent possessed a full memory window, new244
data points supplanted the oldest.245
Skew. The skew parameter represented an interpretative bias by determining the246
degree to which temperature trends were skewed by the agent during processing. Positive247
values of skew bias the agent against climate change, negative values towards climate248
change, whereas a value of 0 represented unbiased processing (see Equation 1 below). For249
scientists, SS was set to 0 (unbiased processing) in all simulations. For contrarians, SC ,250
was typically set to positive values, reflecting a bias against detection of climate change.251
All parameters were set uniformly across all agents within a class for a given252
simulation run.253
General public254
All general-public agents were also skeptical initially, with a prior belief in255
anthropogenic climate change of 1%, P (CC) = .01. Unlike contrarians and scientists, the256
general-public agents do not draw information directly from any datasets. This reflects257
the likely fact that members of the public do not read the scientific literature but rely on258
interlocutors—represented here by scientific and contrarian voices channeled via the259
media—to inform themselves about climate change.260
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In all simulations, general-public agents were passive listeners whose sole function261
was to receive interpretations of the data, and update their belief in climate change262
accordingly (see Equation 2 below). For all simulations including the general public, 1,000263
such agents were initialised.264
Initialization and evolution over time265
All simulations entailed the initialisation of 1000 agents (scientists and/or266
contrarians), each starting with P (CC) = .01. Agents initially drew a sample of three267
data-points from the chosen dataset into their memory, starting at the specified year of268
data. For instance, an agent drawing from the GISTEMP dataset with a specified start269
year of 1950 would draw the data points (GMST anomalies) for 1950, 1951, and 1952 into270
their initial sample in memory. Those 3 data points enabled the agent to compute the first271
regression slope (1950-1952). No updates were made based on this initial sample. The272
initial sample instead set the prior for going forward to all subsequent belief-updating273
steps.274
Data sampling275
Data sampling occurred annually (see top panel in Figure 3). Scientists and276
contrarians sampled a single data-point from their preferred dataset for the current year,277
adding it to the observations already in their memory window. Thus, for the above278
example, an agent would add the observation for 1953 to the memory window when an279
observation for that year became available, and so on. Once data had been sampled, the280
agents then calculated a standard regression slope, β, from the data points in their281
memory window (as illustrated in Figure 2). This trend represented the change in282
temperature up until the present year, going back as far as their memory window allows.283
Figure 4 illustrates this process for two hypothetical agents with two different sizes of284
memory window.285
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A given value of β obtained during data sampling was retained by the agent286
throughout the 5 communication events, described below, that were presumed to occur287
during the same year.288
Updating beliefs from data289
The calculated regression slope, β, was then interpreted as a Likelihood Ratio (LR)290
that provided evidence for (or against) the climate change hypothesis as follows:291
LR = 10β−S , (1)
where the more positive the slope (β), and the lower the skew parameter (S), the larger292
the LR value. If the β − S term is > 0 (and thus the slope is still considered positive,293
having taken into account a potentially biased interpretation), the LR is > 1, indicating294
support for the climate change hypothesis. In the same manner, if the β − S term is equal295
to zero (and no positive trend is perceived, having taken into account a potential bias),296
the LR value is 1, representing complete ambiguity. Finally, if β − S is negative, the LR is297
< 1, indicating support against the climate change hypothesis. This process of computing298
the LR ensured that agents could encounter evidence either for or against the299
climate-change hypothesis. Unless a bias was introduced by setting S to a non-zero value,300
our agents were not predestined to inevitably settle either on endorsement or rejection of301
the hypothesis. Figure 5 illustrates this process.302
The LR values are then plugged into the log-odds form of Bayes theorem to update303







The odds on the right-hand side of the equation represent the agent’s beliefs in the305
climate change hypothesis (CC) and its complement, namely that there is no climate306
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change (¬CC). The odds on the left-hand side of the equation represent the updated307
beliefs in the two competing hypotheses, given the evidence (E) just introduced by the308
likelihood ratio (LR).309
Communication rounds310
Each data sampling event was accompanied by 5 communication rounds (see top311
panel, Figure 3), during which the agents exchanged information. This mimicked the idea312
that although annual data become available once a year, scientists repeatedly exchange313
their views about those data throughout the year. Depending on the simulation,314
communication could occur just among scientists (S) and contrarians (C) involving all315
possible pairings (i.e., S → C, S → S, C → C, and C → S), or additionally also from316
scientists and contrarians to the general public. The manipulation of the communication317
regime permitted selective tests of mechanisms within the scientific community (e.g.,318
seepage) as well as mechanisms involving the public (e.g., contrarian influence). At each319
round, each agent (when present) received exactly one communication according to the320
following rules.321
Selection of communicators. For each of the 5 communication rounds, a random322
sample of scientists (and contrarians, when present) were selected to be communicators.323
Sampling was with replacement, so the same agent might be involved in communicating324
on more than one occasion. The selection of a pool of communicators permitted325
manipulation of the proportion of scientists and contrarians in the pool independently of326
their prevalence in the population (see next section). The number of agents in each pool327
was N = 10 (Simulation 1), N = 5 (Simulation 2), and N = 100 (Simulations 3 and 4).328
Communication among scientists and contrarians. When scientists or contrarians329
communicate among themselves, a random communicator from the pool passes on their330
latest slope estimate obtained during data sampling (β) to a random recipient agent, until331
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all scientists and contrarians in the simulated population have received exactly one value.332
Recipients then interpret this slope via Equation 1 (thereby introducing their own bias),333
before updating their belief in climate change via Equation 2. Communicators are334
sampled with replacement from the pool so each communicator may be involved in more335
than one communication.336
Communication to the general public. When scientists and contrarians communicate337
to the general public, a random communicator passes on their latest LR value338
(Equation 1) to a random member of the public, until all members have received exactly339
one value. The recipients directly update their belief in climate change using their340
received LR value via Equation 2.341
The public therefore receives the interpretation of the data made by the342
interlocutors, rather than the original data. This reflects the fact that scientists (and343
contrarians) do not communicate the exact values of decadal warming trends to the344
public, but their interpretation of those trends. We additionally model the potential345
amplifying effects of the media by varying the representation of contrarians in346
communications independently of their actual number (see next section).347
General simulation settings and manipulations348
Several further system-wide simulation parameters were manipulated:349
StartYear: Time from which the data sampling process starts. Set to 1950350
throughout.351
ConProp: Proportion of agents that are categorized as contrarians (the remainder352
being mainstream scientists). In reality, this proportion has been estimated at no more353
than .03 (3%) of practicing climate scientists across numerous studies (summarized by354
Cook et al., 2016). Any value greater than 3% thus models the inclusion of other355
Influence and seepage 16
contrarian operatives, such as bloggers or think tanks, who are known to vocally publicize356
their own interpretations of the data (Farrell, 2016).357
ConRep: The proportion of contrarians represented in the pool of communicators.358
There is evidence that contrarians tend to receive disproportionately more exposure in the359
media (Verheggen et al., 2014), presumably because the media seek to “balance”360
competing voices (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). If 3% of the population of agents are361
contrarian, the communicator pool could either be representative (100 communicators, of362
which 3 are contrarian), or over-representative (e.g., 6 contrarians—double their363
prevalence in the population).364
All simulations run until the entire historical temperature record (through the end365
of 2017) has been observed by agents, and the last 5 rounds of communication have been366
completed. Each simulation experiment involved 100 independent replications within each367
cell of the experimental design. The dependent variable of greatest interest in all368
experiments was the belief in climate change, P (CC), over time, split by agent group and369
averaged across the 100 replications within each experimental cell. The model was370
programmed in Netlogo (version 6.0.1) and simulations were run using the RNetlogo371
package in R (Thiele, 2014). The Netlogo source code and output from all simulations is372
available for download at373
https://github.com/StephanLewandowsky/ABM-seepage-and-influence. The bottom374
panel in Figure 3 provides an overview of the 4 simulation experiments and indicates their375
purpose.376
Simulation Experiment 1: Scientific consensus formation377
The first simulation described how a scientific community builds a consensus belief378
around climate change by examining and discussing the data over time, and how that379
consensus is communicated to the public. In this simulation, all agents were unbiased380
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(SS = 0) and the two principal independent variables were the choice of dataset381
(GISTEMP vs. HadCRUT) and memory size. Memory size was variously set at 3, 10, 15,382
and 30. The largest memory size (30 years) corresponds to the length of climatological383
baseline that is taken to exceed the duration of short-term fluctuations and reveals384
greenhouse-gas driven warming (Medhaug, Stolpe, Fischer, & Knutti, 2017). The385
intermediate trend lengths (10 and 15 years) are diagnostic of short-term fluctuations and386
are therefore also often considered in the literature (e.g., Risbey et al., 2018). The shortest387
trends (3 years) are scientifically meaningless but are included for comparison, to show the388
effects of short-term variability on knowledge accumulation over time.389
The first run of the experiment (Figure 6) did not include the general public. The390
figure traces the scientific community’s emerging confidence in the proposition that the391
Earth’s climate is changing. Several observations can be made. First, by around 2000, the392
community had settled on the climate-change hypothesis with virtual certainty,393
irrespective of the dataset being used and irrespective of the trend duration being394
considered. Second, as expected, with the (unrealistically) small memory size (MS = 3),395
the collective belief fluctuated more widely, although it also converged on certainty. This396
reflects the fact that notwithstanding short-term fluctuations (positive or negative), a397
rational Bayesian agent will accumulate knowledge over time, and hence the impact of398
short-term fluctuations (represented by the likelihood ratio; LR in Equation 2) will have399
decreasing influence as belief in climate change consolidates (odds on the right-hand side400
of Equation 2). The ongoing updating of the posterior means that, although the memory401
buffer is constantly being updated and earlier memories are forgotten, the new prior402
(yesterday’s posterior) is higher (if temperatures go up generally) than, say, 5 years ago.403
So at any moment, there is a latent, if not explicit, memory of global warming represented404
in the prior for that updating step. Third, GISTEMP supported faster consensus405
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formation than HadCRUT. This was not unexpected given the coverage biases of406
HadCRUT that are known to have underestimated warming (Cowtan & Way, 2014).1407
It is informative to align the results in Figure 6 with the chronology of the IPCC408
consensus statements (vertical dashed lines). The IPCC’s First Assessment Report (FAR)409
from 1990 acknowledged that warming appeared to be underway, and stated that “The410
size of this warming [0.3◦ to 0.6◦] is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models,411
but it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. . . . The unequivocal412
detection of the enhanced greenhouse effect is not likely for a decade or more.” In fact, it413
took less than a decade. The second assessment report (SAR), published in 1996, stated414
that “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.”415
By 2001, the third assessment report (TAR) reported “There is new and stronger evidence416
that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human417
activities.” The AR4 in 2007 concluded that “Warming of the climate system is418
unequivocal” and that “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since419
the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic420
greenhouse gas concentrations.” Finally, AR5 in 2013 reiterated that “Warming of the421
atmosphere and ocean system is unequivocal”, and additionally stated that “It is422
extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of observed warming423
since 1950, with the level of confidence having increased since the fourth report.” Those424
evolving scientific consensus statements map well onto the simulated temporal increment425
of belief. While this does not provide a quantitative test of the model, it shows at least426
qualitative convergence between the model and the scientific community.427
The second run of the experiment included 1,000 agents that represented the428
general public but was identical to the first run in all other respects (with MS = 15). The429
results are shown in Figure 7, indicating that the general public will absorb the430
information provided by the scientific community and will converge on the same scientific431
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consensus, albeit with a delay. The delay reflects the fact that the general public does not432
have access to the raw data, relying instead on receiving communications from the433
scientists. The total number of information sources is thus reduced relative to the434
information available to the scientists themselves.435
The results of simulation experiment 1 are straightforward and largely unsurprising:436
given the evidence available, the scientific community converges onto a consensus position.437
When the public benefits from the scientific information, they too acquire the consensus438
position through communication alone. Both runs of simulation experiment 1 only439
included unbiased agents. The remaining simulation experiments explore the operation440
and impact of denial in various contexts.441
Simulation Experiment 2: Motivated denial442
Simulation experiment 2 examined the process of denial. We particularly wanted to443
identify the conditions that are necessary for a rational Bayesian agent to avoid acquiring444
a belief in the hypothesis that climate change is real. One known way in which contrarians445
seek to mislead the public is by focusing on short-term temperature fluctuations446
(Lewandowsky, Ballard, et al., 2016). For example, the claim that global warming had447
“stopped” first arose in 2006, based on 8 years of data (Carter, 2006). This experiment448
therefore manipulated the size of the memory window, with MC set to 3, 5, and 10. Based449
on the results of the first experiment, we expected such short-term focus to be insufficient450
to induce denial in our rational agents. We therefore also manipulated the agents’ bias451
(see Equation 1) by setting SC = .015 in one condition. This bias effectively prevented an452
agent from detecting any but the most extreme short term warming trends.453
Figure 8 displays the results. Consider first the top row of panels, which represents454
unbiased agents (SC = 0). It is clear that irrespective of memory size, unbiased agents455
cannot avoid acquiring belief in climate change. However, this behavior does not capture456
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the actual nature of denial, which has exhibited persistence across many decades. An457
analysis of more than 16,000 contrarian documents revealed that organized denial458
continued unabated during the period 1998 through 2013 (Boussalis & Coan, 2016) . This459
stability of denial is reflected in the bottom panels of Figure 8. Irrespective of memory460
size, those agents never accept the hypothesis of climate change, owing to their biased461
interpretation of the evidence (SC = .015).462
The second experiment clarified that persistent denial in Bayesian agents becomes463
possible only through the introduction of a bias. A focus on short-term trends by itself is464
insufficient to prevent endorsement of the climate change hypothesis. We next consider465
what happens when a share of such biased agents are introduced into the scientific466
community.467
Simulation Experiment 3: Seepage of denial?468
This simulation experiment examined the effects of denial on the scientific469
community. Two classes of agents formed the population of 1,000: The mainstream470
scientists were unbiased (SS = 0) and used a constant memory size of MS = 15. A small471
proportion of the agents, represented by the parameter ConProp that was variously set to472
3%, 10%, or 20%, were contrarian. Those agents used a memory size of MC = 3 (to473
represent extreme focus on short-term fluctuations) and were biased, SC = .015 (to474
exhibit persistent denial). To accentuate the differences between the two classes of agents,475
mainstream scientists relied on GISTEMP and contrarians relied on HadCRUT. (In476
reality, scientists would examine both those datasets and several additional products as477
well.)478
All agents, irrespective of whether they were scientists or contrarians, communicated479
with each other 5 times after each data-sampling event. During those communication480
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events, the representation of contrarians in the pool of communicators was varied481
(specified by ConRep) independently of their actual prevalence.482
The results are shown in Figure 9. Consider first the top-left panel, which most483
closely represents the known composition of the scientific community. In this cell, 3% of484
the agents are biased contrarians. Like mainstream scientists, they are assumed to publish485
in the literature and thus communicate their opinions to the remainder of the community.486
This assumption appears realistic in light of the small but measurable number of487
contrarian articles that continue to appear in print (Cook et al., 2013).488
The presence of contrarian voices does not prevent the scientific community from489
settling on the consensus position. Indeed, there is little evidence that the small number490
of contrarians had any effect on the scientific community, as indicated by the nearly491
complete overlap with the denial-free baseline from simulation experiment 1 (dashed gray492
line). Note, however, that this reflects extremely conservative assumptions because the493
contrarian agents communicate their estimate of the slope (β) before applying their bias494
(SC). Their influence is thus limited to the cherry-picking associated with a small memory495
window.496
The remaining 8 panels of Figure 9 explore the effects of increasing the proportion497
of contrarians (rows of panels) and their representation in communication (columns). Any498
increase in the proportion of contrarians beyond the empirically-established 3% of499
scientists involves the assumption that other, non-academic actors such as bloggers and500
think tanks contribute to the discussion in the scientific community. Given that blogs501
demonstrably contribute to science denial (for a discussion, see Lewandowsky, Oberauer,502
& Gignac, 2013; Lewandowsky, Cook, et al., 2015), in particular through harassment of503
scientists (e.g., Lewandowsky, Mann, Brown, & Friedman, 2016), this assumption appears504
plausible, although the extent of the influence of non-scientific actors on the scientific505
community is difficult to quantify. The assumption that contrarians are given506
Influence and seepage 22
disproportionate access to communication (i.e., the center and right columns of panels) is507
supported by content analysis of U.S. prestige media. During the period 1988-2002, more508
than half of that coverage was found to balance scientific and contrarian views (Boykoff &509
Boykoff, 2004). The share of contrarian discourse in the media peaked around 2009, with510
more than 3,000 articles in the U.S. media (Boykoff & Olson, 2013). In 2011-2012,511
contrarians were cited in 17% of media articles on climate change (Brüggemann &512
Engesser, 2017)513
These analyses leave little doubt that contrarian voices are over-represented in514
public discourse, although the magnitude of that over-representation is uncertain. We515
therefore take no position on which of the 8 cells is most likely to be “correct.” The next516
simulation experiment provides more constraints on which of those 8 cells appears most517
realistic in light of empirical data.518
Overall, the pattern in Figure 9 clarifies that contrarian voices, even if amplified519
beyond their actual numbers, do not prevent the scientific community from settling on a520
consensus position. This reflects current reality, which has seen the formation of a521
pervasive scientific consensus notwithstanding intense contrarian activity. In all panels,522
scientists ultimately converge on complete acceptance of the climate change hypothesis.523
However, and perhaps most relevant in the present context, we also observed evidence for524
seepage (Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al., 2015). Eight out of the 9 panels in Figure 9525
exhibit an effect of seepage because the belief formation in the scientific community is526
delayed relative to the denial-free baseline. The one exception to this pattern is the527
top-left panel, which effectively assumes that the entire political apparatus that is528
enveloping the scientific community—from think tanks to bloggers to opinion writers—has529
no effect on scientific discourse because contrarian voices are limited to 3%. We find this530
assumption to be overly conservative.531
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Figure 10 shows the same results, but for 1990 onward only. This close-up on the532
last three decades is necessary because the alleged “pause” in warming from533
approximately 1998 onward (Figure 1) was cited as an example of possible seepage by534
Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al. (2015). The figure offers limited support for that contention.535
Clear evidence for seepage arises only when the prevalence of communications between536
scientists and contrarians is at least 20%. For example, the center panel and bottom-left537
panel show evidence for seepage when the proportion is 20%, and the right-most column538
of panels shows strong evidence when the proportion is at 50%. In light of the clear539
evidence for amplification of contrarian voices, Figure 10 may well point to the presence of540
seepage, although the evidence is not as clear as for the overall delay of consensus541
formation in Figure 9.542
Figures 9 and 10 also clarify that contrarians are oblivious to the evidence and to543
communications from mainstream scientists. Note that this outcome was not a foregone544
conclusion because even though simulation experiment 2 identified the need for a bias545
(SC = .015) to model the persistence of denial, that was done for a community that546
exclusively involved biased agents. In the present experiment, by contrast, the 5547
communication events associated with each data sampling event involved a population in548
which the vast majority of agents were unbiased. It follows that the contrarian agents here549
were exposed to far more information that could have swayed their opinions than in550
simulation experiment 2. Yet, even after receiving consistent trend information indicative551
of global warming for decades, the contrarians continued to resist the evidence (compare552
Figure 8 to the solid orange lines in all panels in Figure 9).553
The asymmetry in influence between the two groups of agents is worth noting: On554
the one hand, scientists, with their unbiased view of the data, can be deleteriously555
impacted by poor and biased data selection (i.e., short-term trends) from an556
over-represented minority. Recall that communication among the agents involves557
Influence and seepage 24
transmission of their estimate of the trend, β, which is then used to update beliefs in the558
same manner as direct sampling of the data. Contrarians, on the other hand, are559
protected from the reverse effect because of their bias at the point of interpretation. Thus,560
whatever estimate of β a contrarian receives, the introduction of a bias (Equation 1)561
protects them from updating their knowledge in accordance with the evidence.562
We next examine the impact of the commmunication regime introduced in this563
simulation, involving a majority of mainstream scientists and a small number of564
contrarians, on the general public.565
Simulation Experiment 4: Science, denial, and the public566
This simulation included a further 1,000 agents that represented the general public.567
Except for the addition of communication events with the general public, the experimental568
design and parameter settings were identical to the preceding simulation experiment.569
The results are shown in Figure 11, using the same layout of panels as before. Of570
greatest interest here is the impact of denial on public opinion. Overall, it is clear that the571
presence of denial slows the public’s convergence onto the scientific consensus position and572
sometimes prevents that convergence altogether. The details of that effect are informative.573
First, as shown in the left-most column of panels, increasing the proportion of contrarian574
voices alone is insufficient to prevent the public’s recognition of the scientific consensus.575
Even with 20% of all interlocutors being contrarian, the public ultimately comes to share576
the belief of the majority of scientists. Second, for the public to remain unconvinced by577
the scientific evidence requires an over-representation of contrarian voices in public578
discourse. Specifically, public opinion in the U.S. at the moment is perhaps best captured579
by the data shown in the rightmost column of panels. Although it is not straightforward580
to map survey data into Bayesian probabilities, the finding that around 70% of the581
American public currently think that global warming is happening (e.g., Leiserowitz,582
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Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, & Cutler, 2017) does not mesh well with values of583
P (CC|E) near 1.0 that are observed for the general public in the left column or the top584
part of the center column in Figure 11. To capture public opinion, therefore, contrarian585
voices must be disproportionately represented, perhaps even to the extent that the586
number of mainstream scientific messages received by the public is exactly equal to the587
number of contrarian messages that deny climate change (right column).2588
Are those assumptions warranted? There are several independent lines of evidence589
that support the notion that contrarian voices are disproportionately represented in public590
discourse. First, contrarian scientists report that they have greater media exposure than591
mainstream scientists (Verheggen et al., 2014). Second, the media’s commitment to592
“balance” leads to coverage that often favours contrarian talking points (Boykoff &593
Boykoff, 2004; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2017). Third, certain media outlets in the U.S.594
have taken explicitly contrarian stands, including Fox News, the Washington Times, and595
the Wall Street Journal. Others, including Washington Post and New York Times, have596
regular columnists who promote contrarian positions. Fourth, contrarian organizations597
have regularly placed advertisements in leading newspapers to argue against climate598
action or question the science (Supran & Oreskes, 2017). Taken together, those sources of599
evidence suggest that the public—unlike the scientific community—may well receive an600
equal number of messages that affirm or deny climate change, respectively, from the601
interlocutors they are exposed to.602
Exploration of parameters603
The simulation experiments relied on two principal parameters: The memory size,604
M , and the bias in interpreting the perceived trend, S. It is useful to examine their effects605
on the moment-to-moment perception of the data, captured by the likelihood ratio (LR)606
in Equation 1. Figure 12 shows the effects of memory size on the LR for a simulation of607
Influence and seepage 26
the (unbiased) scientific community. The pattern is unsurprising but nonetheless608
informative. With a small memory buffer, the LR becomes highly variable and frequently609
dips below 1, implying a temporary reduction in the belief in the climate-change610
hypothesis. However, even with a small memory buffer, the temperature data contain a611
sufficiently strong signal for the LR to be, on average, above 1. This explains why a focus612
on short-term trends, often used by contrarians in public discourse to claim that warming613
has “stopped” (Carter, 2006), is insufficient to sustain disbelief in global warming without614
also introducing a bias. With a larger buffer, M = 15 and M = 30, the LR is consistently615
above 1 from the mid-1970s onward, in line with the identified onset point of global616
warming (Cahill, Rahmstorf, & Parnell, 2015).617
Figure 13 examines the effect of the bias parameter, S, on the LR. The most notable618
aspects of those results is that even with a “cooling” bias of .015, the LR does not fall619
much below 1 during the period of global warming (from mid 1970 onward). The620
persistence of denial may therefore be best understood as a failure to update an621
(inappropriately-skeptical) belief in light of evidence.622
General Discussion623
This paper explored the reasoning components that underpin the potential for624
disbelieving climate change when faced with the actual observed temperatures. All agents,625
whether mainstream scientists, contrarians, or the public, revised their beliefs in626
accordance with Bayesian principles, the gold standard of rational belief formation (see627
Equations 1 and 2). Our simulations yielded several insights: (a) unbiased agents628
necessarily acquire belief in the climate-change hypothesis even from an initial position of629
extreme skepticism; (b) to persist with denial, agents must be biased; (c) the presence of630
such biased agents can delay, but not prevent, belief formation in the scientific631
community; (d) the presence of contrarian voices, especially when disproportionately632
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represented, can prevent the public from acquiring the scientific consensus position. We633
take up the implications of those results later, after we acknowledge and discuss several634
limitations of the present work.635
Potential limitations and avenues for future exploration636
Our simulations aimed to balance parsimony with realism. We achieved parsimony637
by limiting agents to two free parameters, M and S, with the remainder of their638
architecture being fixed by Bayesian principles. Those tight constraints on the639
architecture limited the realism of our results. For example, although simulation640
experiment 4 yielded a realistic estimate of current public opinion with plausible641
assumptions about denial (Figure 11), the simulated public acceptance of climate change642
lagged far behind the American public, which 20 years ago endorsed the climate-change643
hypothesis to a similar extent than is seen now (e.g., Brulle et al., 2012).644
Several aspects of our model may have contributed to this quantitative mismatch.645
For example, the model excluded a number of mechanisms that are known to affect the646
public’s reasoning about climate change, such as perceived source credibility (Hahn,647
Harris, & Corner, 2009; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2016), or worldviews and political648
attitudes (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2015; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). The649
model also focused on a single scientific updating process, and other regimes might be650
worth considering in the future. For example, scientists may consider the long-term record651
only, looking for some kind of meaningful change point in the warming trend instead of652
recomputing it from observations in the presumed memory window. Moreover, given that653
scientists’ careers do not extend across the time span simulated here (nearly 70 years),654
some inter-generational transmission process must exist that permits junior scientists to655
build on existing knowledge in the discipline without monitoring the data for decades.656
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Inter-generational processes can readily be modeled in an agent-based framework (Holman657
& Bruner, 2017).658
We focused on GMST (Figure 1) as the only source of evidence for climate change.659
Although GMST is a primary climatic indicator, and arguably the one that is discussed660
most often in public, it is only one among many. Other indicator variables include sea661
level rise, cryosphere variables such as the mass balance of glaciers, biological indicators662
such as species migration, and so on (e.g., Hartmann et al., 2013; Rhein et al., 2013;663
Vaughan et al., 2013). In reality, scientists consider all of those variables together, and it664
is their converging support for the same conclusion, known as consilience (Oreskes, 2007),665
that buttresses the scientific consensus position. Although denialist talking points are666
known to extend to those other indicator variables (Lewandowsky, Ballard, et al., 2016), it667
remains to be seen how seepage and influence play out in a multivariate environment.668
Implications and potential interventions669
Irresistible evidence for global warming670
Our simulations showed that unbiased agents necessarily acquire belief in the671
climate-change hypothesis, even when they start from an initial position of extreme672
skepticism and even when they rely on unduly short temperature trends. This result673
meshes well with a previous analysis of the success of hypothetical bettors that placed674
bets on global temperatures at various points in history. That analysis found that since675
1970, any bet against warming—even those involving cherry-picking of short-term cooling676
trends—would have been unsuccessful (Risbey, Lewandowsky, Hunter, & Monselesan,677
2015).678
The corollary result, that agents must be biased in order to persist with denial, also679
meshes well with existing results. For example, the need for biased processing is680
compatible with the fact that denial is a political operation rather than a scientific681
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endeavour (Dunlap & McCright, 2011). Biased processing is also revealed when contrarian682
talking points are subjected to a blind expert test (Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes,683
2016; Lewandowsky, Ballard, et al., 2016). In those studies, climate data and contrarian684
claims about those data (e.g., “warming has stopped”) were translated into another685
domain, for example by presenting GMST data as “world agricultural output.” Expert686
economists and statisticians then judged the contrarian claims to be misleading while687
endorsing the interpretation advanced by mainstream scientists.688
Although we modeled denial by including a bias parameter, it does not follow that689
resistance to evidence is “irrational.” On the contrary, denial has been identified as a690
rational political operation of considerable effectiveness (Lewandowsky, Cook, & Lloyd,691
2016), and even under a fully Bayesian approach, resistance to evidence can be modeled692
by inclusion of auxiliary hypotheses (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Gershman, 2018).693
Seepage and influence694
One purpose of the simulations was to test the idea that denialist talking points695
may seep into the scientific community, perhaps altering the way in which scientists696
interpret data (Lewandowsky, Oreskes, et al., 2015). The evidence for this was clear in697
general, but more mixed in the specific context of the alleged “pause.” On the one hand,698
consensus formation was delayed by the presence of denial whenever the functional699
proportion of contrarian voices exceeded their nominal proportion of 3% (Figure 9). As we700
argued earlier, the known machinery of denial (e.g., blogs, think tanks, opinion pieces)701
most likely amplifies contrarian voices beyond their actual number, and so it seems702
warranted to conclude that denial can have an effect on the scientific community. On the703
other hand, an effect of seepage during the period of the presumed “pause” in warming704
was only observed when liberal assumptions were made about the influence of denial (viz.,705
20% or more of all voices being heard by scientists are contrarian).706
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It must be noted that our model of the scientific community was highly idealized.707
Each agent was fair and unbiased and accurately interpreted the data using a708
climatologically reasonable window. Nonetheless, the injection of biased contrarian voices709
into this idealized community was sufficient to delay consensus formation. This occurred710
without any bad faith, corruption, dishonesty, or bias on the part of scientists, putting to711
rest a potential criticism that the seepage notion entails an accusatory or critical stance712
against scientists. Other related work has also shown that the pernicious effects of713
industry funding of research (e.g., the death toll associated with class-I antiarrhythmic714
drugs; Holman, 2017) can arise without corruption of individual scientists, simply from715
methodological diversity and a merit-based system (Holman & Bruner, 2017). Similarly,716
Weatherall, O’Connor, and Bruner (2018) presented an agent-based model of the tobacco717
industry’s efforts to undermine the scientific evidence about the harm from smoking. The718
model relied on a two-pronged propagandistic effort: first, promoting and sharing of719
independent research that conformed to the industry’s position, and second, funding of720
additional research with selective publication of the results. Both lines of attack have been721
well documented by historians (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Proctor, 2011). Weatherall et al.722
(2018) showed that their selective-sharing model could explain how policy makers failed to723
recognize the seriousness of the harm from tobacco, and how journalists, by engaging in724
“fair” reporting, inadvertently amplified industry’s impact on public opinion. The model725
showed that there was no need for the tobacco industry to engage in outright fraud or726
conduct biased research of their own. Industry could influence public policy by the less727
expensive and more furtive strategy of selective sharing and communicating.728
In summary, there are now multiple demonstrations that distortions of scientific729
practice, including but not limited to seepage, can be observed without any corruption or730
bias of any individual scientist. One implication of our reliance on an idealized scientific731
community is that our simulations likely provided a lower-bound estimate of seepage. Any732
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departure from this ideal, for example by introducing scientists with their own biases,733
might lead to greater discernible seepage.734
Turning to the effects of denial on the public, there is no doubt that the presence of735
contrarian voices can prevent the public from fully acquiring the scientific consensus736
position (Figure 11). This result is unsurprising, although what is notable is that the737
public remains misinformed about the scientific consensus only when contrarian voices are738
amplified beyond their actual proportion. It is only when scientific information and739
denialist talking points are balanced (or nearly so), that the public will fail to converge on740
the consensus position. Several analyses have confirmed that contrarian voices are741
over-represented in media discourse (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008;742
Brüggemann & Engesser, 2017).743
Our results on seepage and influence fit within the larger context of research on a744
minority’s ability to sway majority opinion (Crano & Seyranian, 2009; Xie et al., 2011,745
2012). One finding from this research is that a committed minority that is immune to746
influence can reverse the prevailing majority opinion under certain conditions (for a747
discussion, see Wiesner et al., 2019). Theoretical work suggests that a minority of 10% is748
sufficient to flip a majority (Xie et al., 2011), and experimental evidence suggest that749
around 25% are needed to reverse an initial consensus opinion (Centola, Becker, Brackbill,750
& Baronchelli, 2018). Although we exposed our scientific community to considerable751
dissent by a minority that was immune to evidence (some conditions of simulation752
experiment 4), we did not observe a reversal of the consensus opinion. This resilience,753
relative to other modeled communities, likely arose from the presence of independent754
evidence (i.e., the observed temperature trends) which prevented intransigent contrarian755
opinions from swaying the majority.756
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Potential interventions757
Our model explored specific questions about belief formation in a contested758
environment. The model also points to a deeper and more general problem: how to model759
and potentially reduce the dissemination of misinformation in social systems. Humans760
constantly share their beliefs and information. While this allows for debate, reasoning,761
and education, such social networks also support the dissemination of sub-standard or762
downright false information. Our model can point to potential remedial measures: In763
simulation experiment 4, we found that when contrarian views are communicated to the764
public in proportion to their actual prevalence, the public will not be thwarted from765
accepting the scientific consensus position. This result suggests that one effective766
intervention in public discourse would be to avoid the disproportionate amplification of767
contrarian voices in media discourse. Fahy (2018) reports several encouraging768
developments in journalistic practice that may meet this challenge.769
Further work could build on this foundation by specifying the media-intermediary770
processes in more detail (e.g., how people select news sources based on political771
preference, or how people’s perceptions of credibility affect the updating process). Madsen772
and Pilditch (2018) have successfully deployed a Bayesian source-credibility model to773
investigate mass-persuasion attempts, pointing to ways in which a more nuanced model of774
public opinion on climate change might be constructed. Hills (2018) outlined how775
cognitive heuristics can contribute to polarization and the spread of misinformation.776
Recommendations to overcome those problems were provided by Hills (2018) and777
Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook (2017).778
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Footnotes1058
1059
1 In reality, scientists had access to both products and their judgment in all60
likelihood would have rested on an aggregation of information from both datasets.1061
2 The three panels in the right column are identical. This is no accident because1062
when the public representations of views are set to be identical (i.e., 50-50 in each panel),1063
the actual proportion of contrarians in the community no longer matters.1064
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Figure Captions1065
Figure 1. Global mean surface temperature (GMST) anomalies from two datasets. GISS1066
= NASA GISTEMP (Hansen et al., 2010); HadCRUT4 = UK Met Office (Morice et al.,1067
2012). The datasets use slightly different climatological baselines (GISTEMP: 1951–1980;1068
HadCRUT: 1961-1990). To align the datasets for display purposes, all anomalies here are1069
re-baselined to the period 1981–2010.1070
Figure 2. Observed magnitude of temperature trends as a function of vantage year and1071
the number of years included in the computation of the trend. Trends are capped at ±1K1072
for plotting. For each vantage year (columns), trends are computed for all possible1073
windows between 3 and 25 years duration (rows), all of which end with the particular1074
vantage year. The dots indicate which trends are significant (p < .05) in an ordinary least1075
squares analysis of annual means, and the horizontal dashed line indicates the number of1076
years that must be included for the trend to be significant from all vantage points. A:1077
Data are HadCRUT4 (Morice et al., 2012). B: Data are GISTEMP (Hansen et al., 2010).1078
Figure 3. a. Overview of agent-based model with communication and updating cycles.1079
See text for details. b. Summary of simulation experiments. See text for details.1080
Figure 4. Illustration of regression slope calculations for a typical scientist agent1081
(subscript S) and a contrarian agent (subscript C). The scientist possesses a larger1082
memory window (MS = 15) than the contrarian (MC = 3) from t0 (the current year) back1083
through time. This leads to a difference in calculated regression slopes, where βS reflects1084
the long-term warming trend, whereas βC reflects a short-term cooling trend.1085
Figure 5. Illustration of how perceived regression slopes are converted into likelihood1086
ratios (LR) that are then used for belief updating according to Equation 2. The scientist1087
agent provides βS , and because the scientist is unbiased, the positive βS value is converted1088
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to a positive likelihood (LRS > 1), providing support for the climate change hypothesis.1089
By contrast, the positive value of the skew parameter (SC = .1) for the contrarian agent1090
accentuates the already negative slope (βC) as even greater evidence against climate1091
change (LRC < 1) For illustrative purposes, the value of SC is considerably larger here1092
than in the simulations.1093
Figure 6. Results of Simulation Experiment 1 involving only a community of scientists.1094
All agents are unbiased (SS = 0) and consider data either from GISTEMP (left panel) or1095
HadCRUT (right panel). Each plotted line represents a different memory size (MS); see1096
legend. The vertical dashed lines mark release dates of IPCC consensus reports, from the1097
First Assessment Report (FAR) through the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).1098
Figure 7. Results of Simulation Experiment 1 involving a scientific community together1099
with a general public. See text for details of how agents communicate with each other. All1100
agents are unbiased (SS = 0) and consider data either from GISTEMP (left panel) or1101
HadCRUT (right panel). The vertical dashed lines mark release dates of IPCC consensus1102
reports, from the First Assessment Report (FAR) through the Fifth Assessment Report1103
(AR5).1104
Figure 8. Results of Simulation Experiment 2. Agents are either unbiased (SC = 0; top1105
row of panels) or are biased to downplay the observed trend (SC = .015; bottom row of1106
panels). Agents consider data either from GISTEMP (left column of panels) or HadCRUT1107
(right). Each plotted line represents a different memory size (MC); see legend. The1108
vertical dashed lines mark release dates of IPCC consensus reports, from the First1109
Assessment Report (FAR) through the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).1110
Figure 9. Results of Simulation Experiment 3. Each panel reports a different condition of1111
the experiment, with the proportion of contrarians ConProp varying across rows, and the1112
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level of representation of contrarians ConRep varying across columns. In each panel, there1113
are 1,000 agents altogether, some of which are set to be contrarian (i.e.,1114
MC = 3, SC = .015). Acceptance of the climate change hypothesis, P (CC|E), is shown1115
separately for mainstream scientist agents (solid blue line) and contrarian agents (solid1116
orange). The variability across replications is indicated in the thickness of the blue lines.1117
For comparison, the belief acquisition without the presence of contrarians (i.e., from1118
simulation experiment 1) is shown by gray dashed lines. The vertical dashed lines mark1119
release dates of IPCC consensus reports, from the First Assessment Report (FAR)1120
through the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).1121
Figure 10. Results of Simulation Experiment 3, shown for 1990 onward. Each panel1122
reports a different condition of the experiment, with the proportion of contrarians1123
ConProp varying across rows, and the level of representation of contrarians ConRep1124
varying across columns. In each panel, there are 1,000 agents altogether, some of which1125
are set to be contrarian (i.e., MC = 3, SC = .015). Acceptance of the climate change1126
hypothesis, P (CC|E), is shown separately for mainstream scientist agents (solid blue line)1127
and contrarian agents (solid orange). The variability across replications is indicated in the1128
thickness of the blue lines. For comparison, the belief acquisition without the presence of1129
contrarians (i.e., from simulation experiment 1) is shown by gray dashed lines. The1130
vertical dashed lines mark release dates of IPCC consensus reports, from the First1131
Assessment Report (FAR) through the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).1132
Figure 11. Results of Simulation Experiment 4. Each panel reports a different condition of1133
the experiment, with the proportion of contrarians ConProp varying across rows, and the1134
level of representation of contrarians ConRep varying across columns. In each panel, there1135
are 1,000 agents that represent mainstream scientists and contrarians, and a further 1,0001136
agents that represent the general public. Results are shown separately for scientists,1137
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contrarians, and the general public. The variability across replications is indicated by the1138
thickness of the lines. The vertical dashed lines mark release dates of IPCC consensus1139
reports, from the First Assessment Report (FAR) through the Fifth Assessment Report1140
(AR5).1141
Figure 12. Values of LR (Equation 1) observed during simulation experiment 1 for1142
different values of M . The horizontal line at 1.0 represents completely ambiguous evidence1143
that leaves current belief unchanged during updating (Equation 2). All agents are1144
unbiased, S = 0, and consider data either from GISTEMP (left panel) or HadCRUT1145
(right panel).1146
Figure 13. Values of LR (Equation 1) observed with two different sizes of the memory1147
buffer; M = 3 in the top row of panels, M = 15 in the bottom row. Each panel plots the1148
observed LR for different values of the bias parameter, S. The horizontal line at 1.01149
represents completely ambiguous evidence that leaves current belief unchanged during1150
updating (Equation 2). All agents consider data either from GISTEMP (left column of1151
panels) or HadCRUT (right).1152
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